EurekAlert November 30, 2020
According to the researchers in Israel a malware could easily replace a short sub-string of the DNA on a bioengineer’s computer so that they unintentionally create a toxin producing sequence. To regulate both intentional and unintentional generation of dangerous substances, most synthetic gene providers screen DNA orders which is currently the most effective line of defense against such attacks. Unfortunately, the screening guidelines have not been adapted to reflect recent developments in synthetic biology and cyberwarfare. Screening protocols can be circumvented using a generic obfuscation procedure which makes it difficult for the screening software to detect the toxin producing DNA. Their experiments revealed that that 16 out of 50 obfuscated DNA samples were not detected when screened according to the ‘best-match’ HHS guidelines. According to the researchers the attack scenario underscores the need to harden the synthetic DNA supply chain with protections against cyber-biological threats. To address these threats, they propose an improved screening algorithm that takes into account in vivo gene edit…read more. TECHNICAL ARTICLE